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Abstract—Modern vehicles may contain a considerable number of 
ECUs (Electronic Control Units) which are connected through 
various means of communication, with the CAN (Controller Area 
Network) protocol being the most widely used.  However, several 
vulnerabilities such as the lack of authentication and the lack of 
data encryption have been pointed out by several authors, which 
ultimately render vehicles unsafe to their users and surroundings.  
Moreover, the lack of security in modern automobiles has been 
studied and analyzed by other researchers as well as several 
reports about modern car hacking have (already) been published.  
The contribution of this work aimed to analyze and test the level 
of security and how resilient is the CAN protocol by taking a BMW 
E90 (3-series) instrument cluster as a sample for a proof of concept 
study.  This investigation was carried out by building and 
developing a rogue device using cheap commercially available 
components while being connected to the same CAN-Bus as a man 
in the middle device in order to send spoofed messages to the 
instrument cluster.      
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern automobiles contain several ECU’s which are 
connected together using a network protocol.  Controller Area 
Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), Media 
Oriented Systems Transport (MOST) and FlexRay are all types 
of in-vehicle networks, with CAN being the most used 
nowadays [1] – [3].  An ECU is a device which controls one or 
more aspects of the electrical system inside a vehicle, such as the 
engine, brakes, airbags and lights.   
Manufacturers started replacing mechanical parts with electronic 
components due to strict rules with regards to emissions for efficiency 
purposes and improving engine performance [4] and [5].  
Consequently, vehicles ended up having several devices connected to 
each other using point-to-point connections, which resulted in an 
increase in complexity and the number of wires used.  This problem 
was solved by implementing the CAN protocol since a robust in-
vehicle network was required [5].  Furthermore, due to the increase in 
the information transfer between the connected devices, vehicles often 
have multiple networks which connect different subsets of ECU’s [1]. 
Data provided over the vehicle network can be very useful in diagnosis 
as well as research [6]. 
One issue with CAN is that security was not even considered 
during its design stages since it was thought that vehicles would 
remain closed systems [7] and [8].  When vehicles were purely 
mechanical, the only way how one could gain access to a car is 
by physical access.  Unfortunately, this is not the case in today’s 
modern vehicles.  External attack surfaces of modern 
automobiles allow the possibility of a remote exploitation 
through various means of channels such as diagnostic tools, CD 
player, Bluetooth and cellular radio [9]. Considering that current 
automobiles rely heavily on software due to the introduction of 
various ECU’s, there are high chances that the code may contain 
bugs or vulnerabilities which when exploited, they can lead to 
potential risks, thus rendering vehicles unsafe.  Moreover, due 
to lack of authentication mechanisms in the CAN protocol, an 
attacker may also connect an external malicious device directly 
with the CAN-Bus with the intention to harm passengers or even 
cause dangerous accidents.    
II. CONTROLLER AREA NETWORK  
CAN is a robust serial communications bus which was 
designed by Bosch in the mid-1980 and has a maximum bitrate 
of one megabit per second [1] and [10] – [13].  One of the main 
goals why CAN was invented is to reduce the wiring costs and 
complexity inside the vehicle [1] and [10] – [12].  It is most 
suitable for systems where a small amount of information needs 
to be exchanged [1], [11] and [12].  Although it was originally 
intended for the automotive industry, it is also being used in 
other industries and control systems, such as medical devices, 
elevators, robotics, building automation and manufacturing [1], 
[4], [11] and [12].  The CAN protocol was subsequently adopted 
as an ISO standard (11898) in 1993 [1] and [4]. 
CAN is implemented as a pair of differentially balanced 
signalled wires (the electrical current in both wires is equal but 
opposite in direction), CAN_H and CAN_L [1], [4] and [12].  
Having a balanced differential signalling results in a field 
cancelling effect, providing high noise immunity, fault tolerance 
and reduces electromagnetic interference [1] and [12].  Bits 
transmitted over CAN-Bus can be either dominant (logical zero) 
or recessive (logical one), where dominant bits win arbitration 
over recessive bits [1], [4] and [10] – [12].  During recessive 
states, CAN_H and CAN_L are both 2.5V while in dominant 
states, CAN_H goes up to 5V whereas CAN_L goes to ground 
[4]. 
The CAN protocol enables prioritisation of messages based 
on their identifiers [1], [4] and [10] – [12], where the lower the 
identifier, the higher the priority [1], [4], [11] and [12].  A CAN 
message can transmit up to eight bytes of data [1], [4], [10] and 
[12].  Moreover, CAN is a message-based network rather than 
address-based and therefore, it does not provide any way how a 
node can transmit a message to only a specific node [1], [11] and 
[12].  Instead, it is a broadcast type of network, meaning that 
each message is broadcasted to all other nodes.  Every node is 
built with a message filtering mechanism which filters messages 
based on their identifiers and considers only those which are 
relevant to it while ignoring others.  Furthermore, nodes on the 
network can be added or removed easily since no modifications 
in the hardware, software or the application layer are required 
[1], [10] and [11]. 
CAN is a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision 
Detection (CSMA/CD) protocol [1], [4], [11] and [12].  When a 
node wants to send messages over the network, it must monitor 
the serial bus first, and if the bus is idle, it can start transmitting.  
If two nodes start transmitting at the same time, a collision is 
detected.  This issue is solved by a non-destructive bitwise 
arbitration, where each transmitter compares its transmitted bit 
with the bit that is monitored on the bus.  The node which has 
lost arbitration has to abort transmission.  As a result, messages 
with the highest priority are transmitted first, while the other 
messages with a lower priority have to wait until the bus is idle 
again [1], [4] and [10] – [12].  Furthermore, the CAN protocol 
supports four different message types; overload, error, remote 
and data frames, with the latter being the mostly used since it is 
used to transmit messages across the network.  Data frames can 
be categorized in standard and extended formats, where the 
standard frame consists of an 11-bit identifier while the extended 
format contains a 29-bit identifier [1] and [10] – [12]. 
III. SECURITY ISSUES IN THE CAN PROTOCOL  
While CAN offers several mechanisms for error detection, 
data integrity and data consistency, it does not provide any form 
of secure communication across the network.  The 
computerization of automobiles has brought several advantages 
such as driver comfort, vehicle efficiency and performance.  
Despite these benefits, this dependence on such devices have 
broadened potential attack surfaces and exposed many 
vulnerabilities as well [5].  Until now, most manufacturers have 
adopted the approach of ‘security by obscurity’, meaning that 
the implementation is kept private so as no one can fully 
understand it and possibly manipulate it [5] and [13].  However, 
it does no longer apply in today’s automotive world since certain 
vulnerabilities may be well-known by attackers.  Several authors 
agree that the CAN protocol lacks security and it does not 
provide any secure methods against malicious attacks [2], [3], 
[5], [7], [8], [13] and [14]. Others argue that while CAN was 
designed for reliability, it was not even designed with security 
in mind [3], [4], [7], [8] and [13].  Furthermore, according to 
Hiroshi et al. [2], message spoofing is considered as one of the 
main threats to in-vehicle networks since it is possible to display 
a falsified value to a vehicle’s speedometer or tachometer or 
even taking control of critical safety systems.     
A. Lack of Authentication 
CAN does not provide any message or device authentication 
in order to identify the sender of a particular message or to 
determine the identity of an ECU [2] – [5], [7], [8], [13] and [14].  
This means that the CAN protocol is not capable of 
distinguishing between a legitimate ECU and a malicious one 
[7] and [14].  This security weakness makes replay attacks and 
transmission of spoofed messages possible since an 
unauthorized device can be easily connected to the CAN-Bus 
[2], [4], [5], [7], [13] and [14]. 
B. Lack of network segmentation 
Originally, CAN was invented as a single serial bus 
connecting all nodes within a single network.  Since all messages 
are broadcasted over the network, any ECU can send messages 
to other critical safety ECU’s, such as the braking control unit 
[13].  This vulnerability makes it easier for unauthorized devices 
to also communicate with other ECU’s which are responsible for 
the safety of the vehicle.  Additionally, if an attacker gains 
access to the CAN cables, s/he may have access to the whole 
network [5].   
C. Lack of data encryption 
Another significant vulnerability in the CAN protocol is the 
lack of data encryption.  CAN does not provide any encryption 
mechanisms to safeguard the integrity and privacy of the data 
[5].  Due to the limited computational power of ECU’s, it is 
difficult to implement robust cryptographic algorithms [3].  
Since CAN does not either provide any form of authentication, 
it makes it even possible for an authorized device to listen to the 
network traffic [5]. 
D. Vulnerable to Denial of Service Attacks 
CAN is also vulnerable to denial of service attacks.  This 
attack can be performed by transmitting consecutive high 
priority messages by sending successive dominant bits on the 
bus [3], [4], [8] and [14].  Such attacks can result in flooding the 
bus, bringing the network down or occupying all bandwidth 
which will make other nodes unable to transmit any messages 
[8] and [14]. 
IV. EXPLOITING CAN VULNERABILITIES 
Due to the lack of authentication in the CAN protocol, it is 
possible to masquerade an ECU or replace a legitimate ECU 
with a malicious one using a hardware device [8].  A device such 
as a hardware circuit board can also be attached to the CAN-Bus 
since the network wires of most vehicles are exposed in easy to 
find locations [14].  Hiroshi et al. [2] describe two attack 
scenarios how spoofing messages on the CAN-Bus can be 
performed.  The first scenario illustrates an attack where the 
original program of an ECU is replaced by a malicious one while 
the other scenario represents an attack where an unauthorized 
device is connected to the CAN-Bus.  Both scenarios are 
depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.   
The European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) is responsible for the security in networks and 
information in the EU and aims to assist and advocate good 
practices with regards to security and resilience of critical 
systems.  Lately, a report was published by this agency to 
identify cybersecurity and the resilience of smart vehicles.  The 
report describes the lack of security in current in-vehicle 
networks and presents the reader with a series of possible threats 
and attack models which can be performed on the network.  
Amongst others, the report mentions that a man in the middle 
attack is possible by connecting an unauthorized device directly 
with CAN-Bus.  Moreover, the report also states that replay 
attacks allow the attacker to identify commands which control 
critical safety systems and also indicates the vulnerability to 
denial of service attacks [15]. 
 
Fig. 1. Substitution of an authorized ECU program. 
 
Fig. 2. Connection of an unauthorized device. 
 
Modern vehicles provide a diagnostic port, called the OBD-
II (On-Board Diagnostic) port which is located under a vehicle’s 
dashboard.  It allows technicians to perform diagnosis on the in-
vehicle network, testing of emissions control and report any 
faults [3] – [5], [8] and [6].  The implementation of this port in 
automobiles has become obligatory both in the US (from 1996) 
and the EU (since 2001) [3], [4] and [15].  Since no 
specifications are provided with regards to the implementation 
of this port, some manufacturers such as the BMW dedicate a 
different sub-network bus (called the Diag bus), while others 
implement it in a way that it is directly connected to the CAN-
Bus.  However, the latter broadens the vehicle attack surface 
since it guarantees direct access to the network [4], [7], [8] and 
[15].  Due to this exposed potential threat, security researchers 
have demonstrated actual attacks to highlight its vulnerability.  
Although OBD was not the main focus of this project, it shows 
what an external device is capable of doing when provided with 
access to the CAN-Bus. 
 
Charlie Miller (director of vehicle security research for 
IOActive) and Chris Valasek (security researcher for Twitter) 
were instructed to research automobile security where they 
managed to inject spoofed messages onto the CAN-Bus of a 
Toyota Prius (2010) and Ford Escape (2010) [5].  This attack 
was possible since the CAN protocol does not provide any form 
of authentication and messages are broadcasted onto the whole 
network.  This experiment is very similar to what Koscher et al. 
have proved. However, the published report includes a detailed 
description of how the attack was carried out and upon which 
cars the attack was tested.  The report also includes the CAN 
architecture implemented in both cars and their respective 
wiring diagrams, the code used to perform the attack, and the 
CAN message IDs of both cars together with their respective 
functions [16]. 
The setup of this attack consisted of a laptop connected to 
the OBD-II port.  Once they managed to read and write to the 
CAN-Bus, message ID’s were identified by performing a replay 
attack.  The results of this experiment concluded that it is 
possible to inject spoofed messages to critical safety ECU’s for 
both vehicles.  Amongst others, this resulted in disabling or 
applying the brakes, killing the engine, display forged values to 
the instrument cluster, locking and unlocking the doors and 
tampering with both interior and exterior lights [16]. 
V. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
The main objective of this paper was to analyze the security 
in controller area networks in modern cars.  This was done by 
connecting a prototype rogue device to the CAN-Bus as a man 
in the middle attack and investigate its resilience to malicious 
attacks.  As a proof of concept and for demonstration purposes 
only, a BMW E90 (3-series) instrument cluster was used.  A 
vehicle simulator was implemented in order to be able to 
simulate the rest of the car.  The simulator was made to work 
both in a demo mode and in a manual mode.  The latter consists 
of a hardware interface consisting of various switches which 
control all gauges and other critical systems of the instrument 
cluster.  On the other hand, the role of the rogue device was to 
modify the data which was being transmitted in order to test 
whether the instrument cluster provides any form of in-built 
security.   
 
Fig. 3. Photo of instrument cluster being hacked by a rogue device in a 
transparent plastic box, displaying an rpm of  5500, 260km/hr and both airbag 
and ABS system disabled. 
 
 
 
VI. DESIGN  
The main components of the design of the project are the 
vehicle simulator, the BMW E90 instrument cluster and the 
rogue device, which are all connected using the CAN_H and 
CAN_L wires, as shown in Fig. 4.  The reason why the BMW 
group was chosen for this proof of concept is that it is a reputable 
brand, which strives to implement secure elements in its 
products.  The instrument cluster was chosen amongst other 
ECU’s inside the vehicle because it is one of the main ECU’s 
which the driver interacts with and it displays information 
related to the car in an understandable way, even for non-
technical people.  The vehicle simulator is responsible for the 
simulation of the rest of the car by sending the appropriate and 
relevant CAN messages over the network as if the cluster was 
installed in a real car.  Meanwhile, the rogue device is 
implemented as a man in the middle device between the vehicle 
simulator and the instrument cluster.  Its function is to receive 
incoming packets from the vehicle simulator, change the data 
which are being transmitted and send them to the instrument 
cluster.  The instrument cluster is powered using an AC/DC 
adapter while the rogue device will be using a battery power 
supply. 
 
Fig. 4. A block diagram of the research project design. 
VII. IMPLEMENTATION  
The implementation stage is categorized into three main 
parts.  The first part describes the reasons why and how the 
instrument cluster ECU was chosen while the second and third 
parts describe in detail the vehicle simulator and the rogue 
device.   
A. BMW E90 (3 Series) Instrument Cluster 
The BMW E90 (3 Series) car was chosen since it is quite a 
common car and has a good reputation of being well engineered 
and solidly built.  After getting familiar with the CAN 
architecture implemented by the BMW and analyzing wiring 
and system circuit diagrams, the instrument cluster ECU was 
chosen as a bench test for this experiment since it is not 
dependent on too many other ECU’s, therefore making it easier 
to be tested as a standalone.  The BMW group has already 
implemented a security feature where a gateway module is 
placed between the different bus systems and several message 
counter mechanisms to make replay and man in the middle 
attacks more difficult.  These message counters work in such a 
way that if the counter of a particular CAN message is not being 
incremented properly, an error is generated.   
B. Vehicle Simulator 
The setup for the vehicle simulator consisted of a CAN-Bus 
shield attached to an Arduino MEGA 2560 board, both 
connected to the instrument cluster using an 18-pin ribbon cable.  
The power supply and ground wires are both connected to the 
Arduino board while the CAN_H and CAN_L wires are 
connected with the CAN-Bus shield.  Power was supplied to the 
Arduino using an AC/DC adapter with an output of 12V 2A. 
Messages were sent onto the CAN-Bus using the 
sendMsgBuf(INT32U id, INT8U ext, INT8U rtr, 
INT8U len, INT8U *buf)  method from the CAN-Bus 
library.  The code was structured in a way that every CAN ID 
has its own method where the data to be transmitted is stored in 
a byte array.  The data inside every CAN message change 
according to the current status of the car such as engine running 
or engine off.  This helps to eliminate any hard-coded messages 
as well as making it easier to build a user interface for the 
simulator.  Furthermore, in order to send messages according to 
their specific timestamp, each CAN ID message has its own 
variable which is responsible for handling message timings.  
Due to the lack of information with regards to how the 
instrument cluster can be controlled and more significantly the 
unknown message timestamps, research was conducted to try to 
find a CAN log from the same model car with correct message 
timings.  Fortunately, a CAN log from the K-CAN of an E90 
BMW car was acquired.  This log consists of both the CAN 
message ID and the data transmitted, but no information 
regarding timings is provided.  The only option was to decode 
and analyze this log in order to determine message timestamps 
by using the 0x130 message (which is sent every 100 
milliseconds) both as a starting point and a reference point. To 
facilitate the identification of the messages required as well as 
the timings at which messages have to be sent, a program using 
C# was developed. 
The BMWSimulator program resides on the Arduino board 
and is responsible for the simulation of the car by sending the 
appropriate CAN messages according to their respective timings 
to the instrument cluster.  The program initialises the CAN-Bus 
at 100Kbits/s and all message counters and message timer 
variables to their appropriate value.  Table 1 describes the CAN 
message ID’s which are sent to the instrument cluster together 
with their data length, description and their respective 
timestamps.  Furthermore, the vehicle simulator can work both 
in a demo mode and in a manual mode, where a toggle switch is 
used to alternate between the two modes.  The demo mode 
shows how the instrument cluster works in a real-life scenario 
while the engine is running.  On the other hand, the two main 
aims of implementing the manual mode are for demonstration 
purposes and to show that several aspects of the instrument 
cluster can be controlled independently, irrespective whether it 
is possible or not in real life.  The manual mode consists of a 
hardware interface made up of various toggle switches, 
potentiometers and push button switches which control all 
gauges and other critical systems of the instrument cluster.  A 
display screen was also used to show the current status of the 
car.    
 
Table 1: Description of the CAN ID’s, data length, description and the 
timestamp at which each message has to be sent. 
 
C. Rogue Device 
The scope of the rogue device was to be implemented as a 
man in the middle, between the vehicle simulator and the 
instrument cluster in order to investigate the level of security 
implemented in the CAN protocol.  This device received 
incoming packets from the vehicle simulator, modify certain 
messages and send them to the instrument cluster.  This 
experiment was carried out to evaluate whether the instrument 
cluster ECU detects an unauthorized device on the CAN-Bus 
and whether it prevents the device from displaying forged values 
to the tachometer and speedometer and disable both the ABS and 
the airbags.  Moreover, power was supplied to the rogue device 
using a battery in order to demonstrate the ease with which such 
a device could be implemented.  This device can be remotely 
controlled using any chosen means such as RF, GSM, or Wi-Fi. 
These two CAN-Bus shields were connected to the 
NodeMCU by referring to the pinout diagram and connecting 
the SPI pins, CS pins (one for each CAN-Bus shields) and the 
positive and negative with their respective pins.  Since the 
NodeMCU and the CAN-Bus shields have different clock 
speeds, the original CNF register values from the CAN-Bus 
library had to be modified with other values. 
Since the NodeMCU provides a Wi-Fi on-board connection, 
an interface for the hacker was developed which enables the 
attacker to establish a connection with the rogue device to 
remotely send forged messages to the instrument cluster.  The 
BMWHacker program resides in the NodeMCU board and it 
provided the attacker with a UDP connection to the BMW 
Hacker interface.  The BMW Hacker interface is a program, 
developed using C#, which enables the attacker to monitor the 
status of the car in real time and to select a forged value for the 
speedometer and tachometer and with the option of disabling the 
airbags and the ABS.  These values are then sent to the rogue 
device which will modify the CAN messages in order to perform 
the attack. 
The instrument cluster has been successfully hacked by 
modifying the data within the CAN message in order to display 
falsified values to the speedometer and tachometer.  Moreover, 
the airbag system and the ABS were also hacked by blocking 
certain messages from being transmitted.  The latter is possible 
because when the instrument cluster stops receiving certain 
messages, an error is displayed.   
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the BMW hacker program. 
 
VIII. RESULTS AND EVALUATION  
The main aim of this research was to look into the lack of 
security in the CAN-Bus protocol, in particular, the lack of 
authentication of devices and the lack of data encryption.  This 
experiment focused on the possibility that an unauthorized man 
in the middle device can be connected to the CAN-Bus with the 
ability to send spoofed messages.  As a result, these weaknesses 
can give the attacker access to the whole network and the ability 
to write and read CAN messages. 
Results have shown that the instrument cluster did not detect 
the unauthorized device, which was successfully connected to 
the CAN-Bus by simply receiving incoming messages and 
sending them over the network.  The instrument cluster neither 
detected that messages were being sent from an illegitimate 
device since it behaved in the same way when messages were 
directly sent from the vehicle simulator.  Furthermore, the 
instrument cluster was not able to detect scenarios which are not 
possible in real life, such as switching on the main beam lights 
without the side lights and driving at maximum speed with no 
fuel.  On the other hand, the instrument cluster managed to detect 
that the handbrake was on while driving. 
 
CAN ID 
(HEX) 
Length 
(Bytes) 
Description Timestamp 
(Milliseconds) 
0A8 8 Torque, Clutch and Brake 
Status 
10 
0AA 8 Engine RPM and Throttle 
Position 
10 
0C0 2 ABS / Brake Counter 200 
0CE 8 Individual Wheel Speeds 10 
0D7 2 Counter (Airbag / Seatbelt 
related) 
200 
130 5 Ignition and Key Status 
(Terminal 15) 
100 
19E 8 ABS / Braking Force 200 
1A6 8 Speed 100 
1D0 8 Engine Temperature, Pressure 
Sensor and Handbrake 
200 
21A 3 Lighting Status 5000 
26E 8 Ignition Status 200 
335 8 Unknown 1000 
349 5 Fuel Level Sensors 200 
34F 2 Handbrake Status 1000 
380 7 VIN Number Once 
39E 8 Set Time and Date Once 
3B4 8 Battery Voltage and Charge 
Status 
4000 
581 8 Seatbelt Status 5000 
IX. CONCLUSION  
Even though BMW strives to implement secure in-vehicle 
networks, it is still vulnerable to attacks.  The use of message 
counters implemented by BMW and the fact that the diagnostic 
port is connected to a separate bus makes it difficult to perform 
such attack using the OBD-II port.  However, the contribution 
of this work shows that it is still possible by simply connecting 
an external device directly to the CAN-Bus.   
Despite the fact that this demonstration was performed on a 
BMW E90 instrument cluster, it implies that such attacks can be 
performed on other car manufacturer’s products as well, as long 
as they use the CAN-Bus protocol in their in-vehicle network.  
Reputable car manufacturers have been implementing certain 
mechanisms to make reverse engineering and attacks more 
difficult, such as the use of message counters in the case of the 
BMW group.  Even though this study was aimed to create 
awareness regarding the lack of security in the CAN-Bus 
protocol, with enough knowledge, time and resources, an 
attacker can still perform such attacks with the intentions of 
harming passengers and cause dangerous road accidents.   
Although manufacturers have acknowledged the lack of 
security in in-vehicle networks, further research is still required 
to provide a more secure automotive environment and to prevent 
malicious attacks.  This project can be further continued to prove 
that denial of service attacks are practically possible in the CAN-
Bus protocol as well as showing their consequences.  
Furthermore, research could also analyze the possibility of 
implementing a security mechanism in order to be able to 
withstand both man in the middle and denial of service attacks.  
This security feature may take into consideration both private 
and public encryption keys which will be encoded in the 
firmware of all ECU’s, therefore making it more difficult for 
replay attacks and for attackers to send or read CAN messages 
over the network. 
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